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Preamble 
My field is mathematical ogic, with a special interest in constructivism, and I would 
not dare to call myself a computer scientist. But some computer scientists regard my 
work as a contribution to their field; and in this text I shall try to explain how this is 
possible, by taking a look at the history of ideas. 
I want to describe how two interrelated ideas, connected with the constructivistic 
trend in the foundations of mathematics, developed within mathematical logic and 
ultimately diffused into computer science. 
It will be seen that this development has not been a quite straightforward one. In the 
history of ideas it often looks as if a certain idea has to be discovered several times, 
by different people, before it really enters into the “consciousness” of science. 
1. The proof interpretation 
The first of these ideas is the so-called proof interpretation of intuitionistic logic, 
also known as the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov interpretation, since it is implicit 
in the writings of Brouwer, and made explicit by Heyting and, independently, by A. 
Kolmogorov. 
The Dutch mathematician Brouwer (1881-1966) achieved international fame by his 
contributions to topology. However, his earliest interest was in the foundations of 
mathematics. His philosophy of mathematics, a special form of constructivism, which 
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became known under the somewhat misleading name of intuitionism, generated a 
lot of interest, gave rise to a heated debate, but attracted few actual followers. But 
even those who did not agree with Brouwer’s ideas, such as Hilbert, were influenced 
by them and by the debate generated by Brouwer’s views. Ideas developed in the 
context of intuitionism turned out to have a relevance which transcends the original 
setting. 
Brouwer’s ideas on the foundations of mathematics were embedded in a highly 
personal and rather extreme version of idealistic philosophy, but it would carry us 
too far to go into this here. The first exposition of these ideas on the foundations 
of mathematics is found in his thesis from 1907 (“On the Foundations of Mathem- 
atics”). 
Briefly, Brouwer viewed mathematics as the activity of building constructions in the 
mind (of an ideal mathematician); mathematics is about such mental constructions, not 
about objects in some outside reality. For Brouwer, there is no platonistic universe of 
abstract ideas existing somewhere quite independently of human cognition. 
In his thesis, Brouwer had not yet realized the effect of his views on logic; but 
in a paper which appeared a year later, in 1908 (“On the unreliability of the logical 
principles”) he did see the consequences. He demonstrated that from an intuitionistic 
point of view, we cannot assume that a mathematical statement is either true or false, 
independent of human knowledge; we can assert “A or not A” only in case we either 
have a proof of A or an argument showing that any attempt at constructing a proof of 
A must fail. 
As a result, if A represents an open mathematical problem, such as Riemann’s hy- 
pothesis, we cannot assert, intuitionistically, that A or not A, since we do not know 
how either to prove A or to refute A. Hence, the so-called “principle of the excluded 
middle” 
A v 1A 
is not an intuitionistic universal logical law. (This does not mean to say that A V IA 
in our example is false, since that would mean we could derive a contradiction from 
A V TA, not just that we are not able to prove it.) 
Implicit in these considerations is another interpretation of logic. In the usual classi- 
cal logic, the meaning of a logical operator c combining statements Al, AZ,. . . , A, into 
~(AI,Az,,.., A,) is explained by describing how the truth or falsity of c(Al,Az,. . . , A,,) 
depends on the truth or falsity of each of the components Al, AZ, . . ., A,,, 
Intuitionistically, the meaning of c is described by explaining what is to be regarded 
as a proof of c(Al, A2 , . . . , A,), assuming one knows what counts as a proof of each of 
Ai, A2,. . ., A,. 
This was made explicit, first by Heyting (1898-1966) in 1930 [22], and more fully 
in 1934 [23], and independently by Kolmogorov (1903-1987) in 1932 [32]. Actually, 
Heyting and Kolmogorov regarded their respective formulations as distinct. To convey 
the idea, let us consider the explanations of V (disjunction, “or”), -+ (implication, 
“implies”) and 7 (negation, “not”) in Heyting’s formulation: 
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l A proof of A v B is given by exhibiting either a proof of A or a proof of B. 
l A proof of A -+ B is a construction f transforming any proof d of A into a proof 
f(d) of B. 
l A proof of TA is a construction which transforms any possible proof of A into a 
contradiction, e.g. 0 = 1. 
One can take the notion of a falsehood or contradiction (I) as primitive; then 1A is 
the same as A --f 1. A falsehood is simply a statement which cannot have a proof. 
These explanations are actually rather vague, since they make use of unexplained 
primitive notions 2 such as “(constructive) proof’ and “construction”. 
However, notwithstanding the vagueness, the explanations serve to justify the usual 
laws of intuitionistic logic, such as A V B + B VA and A 4 (B 4 A), while at the 
same time making it clear why, for example, the principle of the excluded middle is 
not intuitionistically acceptable. 
In Kolmogorov’s interpretation, intuitionistic logic is seen as a calculus of problems; 
each proposition represents a problem. For example, 
l Problem A V B is solved by solving either A or B. 
l A + B is solved if one can reduce the solution of problem B to the solution of 
problem A. 
l 1A is solved if one can show there is no solution of problem A. 
Kolmogorov thought that his interpretation, in contrast to Heyting’s explanations, also 
made sense classically. It should be noted, however, that with the concept of a (math- 
ematical) problem Kolmogorov introduced a notion not present in standard classical 
logic (even if, on an informal level, mathematics abounds with problems). So one 
might say that Kolmogorov interprets intuitionistic logic as an extension of classical 
logic, namely logic enriched with the notion of “solving a problem”. 
There is a parallel here with a contribution of Godel from 1933, where he describes 
an interpretation of intuitionistic logic into classical logic enriched with an extra propo- 
sitional operator Bew, with intuitive meaning “A is provable” for “Bew(A)“. As Giidel 
is careful to point out, “provable” should be taken to mean here “provable by any 
correct means”, not “provable in a fixed formal system”; for the latter notion, some 
of the principles postulated by Godel for Bew are incorrect, as follows from Giidel’s 
incompleteness theorems. If one reads q (necessity) for Bew, Giidel’s principles for 
Bew yield a well-known and elegant axiomatization of the modal logic S4. Godel men- 
tions indeed Kolmogorov’s paper in a footnote, but presumably his work is inspired 
by Heyting’s explanations of the intuitionistic logical operators. 
Returning to Kolmogorov’s own formulation, one may observe that a problem is 
usually expressed by a mathematical statement, and “solving the problem A” then 
corresponds to “proving A”. This led Heyting to the conclusion, many years later, that 
Kolmogorov’s interpretation and his own were basically the same [24]. 
2 Actually, by choosing an unintended, “non-standard” interpretation of these notions, one can even obtain 
that classical logic is valid! 
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2. Realizability 
The vagueness of the basic notions of “constructive proof” and “construction” pre- 
vents immediate technical applications of the proof interpretation. For such applications 
we need to find a more concrete, perhaps unintended, “model” for these notions. Such 
a model need not be faithful to the informal interpretation, provided that it embodies 
some essential constructive principles. 
A beautiful example of such a concrete version of the proof interpretation is Kleene’s 
interpretation of statements of number theory, first published in 1945, but conceived 
in 1941. 
The key idea is, that the mathematically interesting information contained in a con- 
structive proof of a statement A is the information telling us how existential statements 
and disjunctions occurring in A are to be realized. 
Kleene defines a notion n !A (“n realizes A”), where A is an arithmetical formula, 
12 a natural number. The intuition behind this notion is “n hereditarily encodes the 
information about the realization of existential quantifiers and disjunctions in A”. 
In the version of arithmetic we have in mind, the formulas are constructed from 
term equations t = s using logical operators V, A, +, 1, V, 3. We write n l m for “the 
algorithm with code IZ is applied to argument m”, and (n)~, (n), are the decodings of n 
when IZ is viewed as the code of a pair of natural numbers. Let us look at some clauses. 
l n y(t = s) holds if and only if t = s is true. 
l nt-(A V B) holds if either (n)o = 0 and (n), IA or (n)o # 0 and (n), LB. 
l nyflxA(x) if (n), yA((n)o). 
l n r (A -+ B) if, whenever m CA, then n l m is defined and n l m realizes B. 
This may be seen as a (fairly crude) modeling of the proof interpretation, where 
the notion of constructive proof is stripped down to “explicit information coded by 
a number concerning the realization of disjunctions and existential quantifiers”. The 
construction in the proof interpretation of an implication is in this model interpreted 
as a (partial) algorithm, or a partial recursive function. Proofs of term equations t = s 
contain no interesting information about realizing V or 3, hence it is irrelevant which 
numbers we take to realize t = s, once one knows that t = s holds. 
It looks at first sight as if Kleene’s notion of realizability is straightaway inspired by 
the proof interpretation. However, the historical development is not quite that straight- 
forward. According to Kleene’s own remarks in a retrospective paper from 1971 [3 11, 
he derived his initial inspiration from the finitistic reading of disjunctions and existen- 
tial statements as “incomplete communications”, explained in considerable detail in the 
standard work by Hilbert and Bemays (actually written by Bemays), “Grundlagen der 
Mathematik” the first volume of which had appeared in 1934. 
To explain the situation, this requires a digression. In the first quarter of this century, 
Hilbert formulated with increasing precision his programme of saving classical math- 
ematics from the paradoxes by codifying existing mathematical practice in a formal 
system, which then might be regarded as a combinatorial structure, and for which one 
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could hope to prove the consistency (the impossibility of deriving something like 0 = 1) 
by elementary combinatorial (“finitistic”) means. The body of finitistic mathematics is 
assumed to be justified by its intuitive evidence and non-controversial nature. Brouwer 
claimed that this approach had been inspired by the distinction between language and 
metalanguage made in his thesis, and indeed I believe that Hilbert’s programme is for 
some of its ideas indebted to Brouwer, although this has never been acknowledged in 
publications of the Hilbert school. (Needless to say, Hilbert’s aims were completely 
different from those of Brouwer.) Initially, it was believed that finitistic mathematics 
more or less coincided with intuitionistic mathematics. However, as pointed out by 
Bemays in writing [4] this was not correct: finitistic mathematics is more restrictive, 
not permitting general abstract notions such as “arbitrary number theoretic function”. 
Hence, also the proof interpretation as presented above is not immediately meaningful 
from a finitistic point of view. 
Instead, as explained by Bet-nays in the first volume of [26], one could explain 
certain logical operators in statements as “incomplete communications” which had to 
be completed to obtain their finitistic meaning, for example: 
l Completing the assertion A V B means to assert either A or B. 
l Completing the assertion %4(x) is done by providing some d in the range of x such 
that A(d). 
l The assertion -VxA(x) is completed by providing a d such that lA(d). 
l To assert VxA(x) we must have a method for establishing A(d) for any d in the 
range of x. 
Clearly, also on this explanation there are no grounds to assume that VxA(x) V +x,4(x) 
holds generally. No general explanation of A + B is given except as -A v B. 
So Kleene needed another idea for implication. In [31] he wrote: 
The second clue which I consciously tried to use in 1941 was Heyting’s “proof- 
interpretation” as it is rendered in [23, p. 141. [. . .] In my first trial of a definition 
of realizability, I handled implication in a way based on this idea. But the resulting 
definition did not “work” [. . .]. Thus Heyting’s proof-interpretation failed to help 
me to my goal. 
In my second trial, a few weeks later, of a definition of realizability, I thought of 
an implication “A -+ B” in terms of an effective process for converting information 
a to complete ‘A” into information b to complete “B”. This idea “worked” when 
I took into account that the effective process need only lead to a number b when 
applied to a number a which does complete “A”. 
What is remarkable in this quotation is that Kleene did not view his clause for impli- 
cation as an analogue of Heyting’s clause for implication. 
Nevertheless, from our present-day perspective, it seems obvious that realizability 
may be seen as a model of the proof interpretation, where the collection of proofs of 
a statement is modeled by a collection of realizing numbers of the statement; and one 
may think of realizing numbers as “skeletons” of proofs, in which only information 
concerning the disjunctions and the existential statements has been retained. 
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Many variants of realizability have been devised; one of these, q -realizability, 3 en- 
ables us to extract from a constructive proof in, say, intuitionistic first-order arithmetic 
of 
an algorithm, given by a code number m, say, such that in intuitionistic first-order 
arithmetic 
This may be used for a proofs-as-programs method, according to which algorithms 
are found by giving a constructive proof of a statement that is the specification of a 
problem. 
An interesting aspect of Kleene’s realizability is that it gives a classical interpreta- 
tion to formalisms based on intuitionistic logic plus additional principles which are in 
formal contradiction with classical ogic. For example, to first-order arithmetic based 
on intuitionistic logic one may consistently add the “intuitionistic form of Church’s 
thesis”: 
For arbitrary arithmetical A, if bdmA(n, m) (n, m natural numbers), then there is 
an algorithm f such that VnA(n,f(n)). 
This principle is easily seen to be incompatible with classical logic. Another interesting 
principle appears when we consider the extension to second-order arithmetic, i.e. a 
formalism where we can quantify over sets of natural numbers. Writing (t,s) for the 
number coding of the pair t,s, each set Y may also be regarded as coding a set of 
pairs (a binary relation). Extra clauses for realizability include: 
l nlX(t) if X*(n, t), where X* is assumed to be a set variable assigned l-l in a fixed 
manner to the set variable X. (To a variable set X we assign a variable set of pairs 
X*, so that we may read X*(&s) as “t realizes Xs”.) 
l x 1 VX4(X) if VX*(x LA(X)). More informally, a number n realizes a property A(X) 
for all sets X if for all sets of pairs X* (representing arbitrary realization predicates) 
n realizes A(X). 
A remarkable consequence of this definition is that the following highly non-classical 
uniformity principle is realized: 
VEln A(X,n) -+ 3nVX A(X,n) 
Intuitively, this principle says “if for each X there exists a number n such that A(X,n) 
holds, then there is a single number n such that for all X we have A(X,n)“. Classically, 
this is obviously false: take A(X, n) to be the property “n = 0 and X is empty, otherwise 
n = 1 and X is not empty”. One may convince oneself of the plausibility of this 
principle from an intuitionistic point of view as follows. 
3 CJ -realizability may be described as realizability + truth, that is to say x q A -+ A always holds. This is 
achieved by strengthening the clause for implication n q (A -+ B) by adding “and A + B”. 
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Arbitrary sets of natural numbers are very “hazy”, indefinite objects; there is not a 
single element for which we can with certainty determine whether it belongs to the set 
or not. (Think of the set which contains all natural numbers if the Riemann hypothesis 
is true, otherwise it is empty. Intuitionistically, being element of this set is a well 
defined mathematical property, but here is not a single number (at present) for which 
we can guarantee that it belongs to the set, or for which we know for certain that it 
does not belong to the set. So if we can find a natural number n for each set X such 
that A&n), the only way we can imagine for assigning alwuys such a very definite 
object as a natural number to something as indefinite as the arbitrary set, is in a trivial 
way: assign the same number to all sets. 
The definition of realizability for second-order arithmetic first appears in 1970 in 
[35], and the uniformity principle is explicitly formulated in [51]. 
Higher-order arithmetic is a strengthening of second-order arithmetic, where we can 
quantify not only over numbers and sets of numbers, but also over sets of sets of num- 
bers, over sets of sets of sets of numbers, etc. Realizability for second-order arithmetic 
is a first step towards realizability for higher-order arithmetic; and realizability for 
higher-order arithmetic has led towards algorithmic models of the polymorphic lambda 
calculus; we shall return to this later. 
Another possible use one can make of realizability is in finding, in a systematic way, 
constructive equivalents to classical definitions. 
Perhaps, it is illustrative to give also an example of an aspect of the proof inter- 
pretation which has generated technical work and foundational discussion, without any 
decisive results. In other words, so far this has turned out to be a dead end. 
Kreisel in 1960 [33,34] proposed to refine the proof interpretation in the following 
way: 
l the relation “p proves A” ought to be decidable; 
l a proof of an implication A --+ B should consist of a pair (p, f), where f is 
a construction transforming proofs of A into proofs of B, and p is an argument 
showing that f has this property. 
One reason for this sharpening is that one wants to explain “p proves A” for com- 
pound A in terms of notions which are conceptually essentially simpler. Hence, the 
insistence on decidable proof predicates; then one may require that the p in the clause 
for implication above is a proof of an especially simple kind, not itself involving 
proofs of implications or universally quantified statements, but rather something like 
the verification of a term equation with free variables by a straightforward computation. 
3. The work of Gentzen 
Before I come to the history of the “formulas-as-types” idea, I should say a few 
words about the work of the German logician Gerhard Gentzen (1909-1945), which 
constitutes a link between the proof interpretation and formulas-as-types. In 1935 
Gentzen’s paper “Untersuchungen iiber das logische Schliessen” was published. The 
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paper has had, and still has, an enormous impact, especially in proof theory, but also 
in subjects such as theorem-proving. Gentzen’s motivation derived from the problems 
in the foundations of mathematics. In his paper he compared three styles of formalizing 
first-order (intuitionistic and classical) logic: Hilbert-style (as used in formulations of 
Hilbert’s programme, and in the influential book [25]), natural deduction, and what 
we now often call “Gentzen systems”. Gentzen was not the first to formulate natural 
deduction, but he did it for the full language containing all the usual logical opera- 
tors V, A, 3,~) Y, 3, and also for intuitionistic logic, in a convenient presentation. The 
Gentzen systems were new; the reason for introducing them was that they were tech- 
nically more manageable than the other two. 
In each of these formalizations, we may think of the formal proofs as trees, with 
the conclusion at the bottom (the root of the tree), and the axioms (in the case of 
Hilbert-style and Gentzen systems) or assumptions (in the case of natural deduction) 
at the top nodes (the leaves of the tree). The transition from premises, A,B say, to 
conclusion C is marked by a horizontal line, so 
A B 
C 
I shall not discuss the Gentzen systems here, since they are not directly relevant to 
our story. The natural deduction rules for implication logic will be exhibited later. 
The format of Hilbert-type systems is axiom schemata plus deduction rules; there are 
no open assumptions which may be discharged, as in natural deduction. For example, 
intuitionistic implication logic may be axiomatized by the following two schemata: 
A-+(B-tA) 
(A + (B + C)) + ((A 4 B) -+ (A + C)) 
(that is to say, for all formulas A,B, C these are axioms), and a single rule, modus 
ponens, 
If A + B and A, then B. 
Gentzen proved the equivalence (w.r.t. the set of derivable formulas) between the three 
formalizations; moreover, for the Gentzen systems he established a very important prop- 
erty (“Hauptsatz”): any proof of a statement of predicate logic could be transformed 
into a “direct proof”, a proof without detours so to speak, of the same statement. 
In direct proofs only subformulas of the conclusion appeared, there were no detours 
via more complex statements. This property was proved by showing that the so-called 
Cut rule could always be eliminated from a proof, hence Gentzen’s Hauptsatz is also 
known as “Cut elimination”. The corresponding process of eliminating detours for nat- 
ural deduction is usually called normalization, and this was proved in a direct way by 
D. Prawitz in 1965. Gentzen analyzed the natural deduction rules as follows. 
The introductions represent, as it were, the ‘definitions’ of the symbols concerned, 
and the eliminations are no more, in the final analysis, than the consequences of 
these definitions. 
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Gentzen’s idea may be readily understood by reference to the proof interpretation, and 
it may safely be assumed that Gentzen was aware of this, since he clearly showed to 
have grasped the essentials of the ongoing foundational debate. Applied to the rules 
for implication, this yields 
R 
A+B 
If we have a way of getting from assumption A to conclusion B, we have, in fact, 
established A -+ B (without assumption A). [A] indicates zero or more occurrences of 
an open hypothesis of the form A. 
A+B A 
B 
If we have A + B, this means that we have a method for getting from A to B; and 
we have an argument for A; hence B. So this rule may be said to be justified by the 
fact that the introduction rule for ---f tells us that an implication is given by ‘a method 
for getting from A to B’. 
4. Formulas-as-types 
The expression “formulas-as-types” is widely used, but its precise meaning is not 
sharply delimited, since various authors differ in their interpretation. It seems to me 
that one may distinguish at least three aspects (or if you like, “variants”) of the notion, 
as follows. More detailed explanations will follow afterwards. Summing up, one may 
distinguish the following aspects in the formulas-as-types idea (unexplained terms will 
be explained later on). 
(A) 
03) 
(9 
Noting the existence of a parallel between “proof of a formula” and “element 
of a type (set)“, and beyond this the observation that the implicational formulas 
provable in intuitionistic implication logic correspond exactly to the inhabited types 
in the basic theory of type assignment. 
A strengthening of the preceding: the isomorphism between simple type theory 
and natural deduction for minimal (= intuitionistic) implication logic, with /J- 
reduction corresponding to normalization on the deduction side. This isomorphism 
may be extended to full predicate logic by a suitable extension of simple type 
theory. 
The exploitation of the similarities between “proof of a formula” and “element 
of a type” by giving a uniform presentation of rules for proving propositions and 
elementhood of types. 
These three aspects of “formulas-as-types” may be distinguished by the abbrevia- 
tions FAT(A), FAT(B) and FAT(C), respectively. Before discussing the history of 
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this idea, I shall first try to explain formulas-as-types, version (B), more particularly 
for intuitionistic implication logic on the one hand, and simple type theory on the 
other. 
The key idea is the following: intuitionistically, propositions are determined by the 
set of their proofs. We may say that a proof p belongs to a proposition A if p is a 
proof of A. Hence, propositions and the proofs establishing them correspond to sets 
with their elements. 
The analogy does not stop here: the operation of forming the set A + B of functions 
from A to B corresponds to the formation of an implication A 4 B with its proofs 
being constructions mapping the proofs from A to proofs of B. In a similar way (going 
for a moment beyond implication logic), the formation of a Cartesian product A x B 
corresponds to the set of proofs of a conjunction A A B, which are pairs of proofs of 
A and B, respectively. 
However, the sets in this analogy do not correspond so much to sets as we know 
them from axiomatic set theory, but to the types (which may be regarded as special 
sets) in the simple theory of types. In the simple theory of types we have a collection 
of unspecified basic types (denoted by type variables) and some operations for con- 
structing new types from given ones; in particular, the function-type constructor will 
always be present. The rules of simple type theory tell us what the objects are which 
belong to a given type. 
In the formalism of simple type theory (A, for short) we have type terms (expres- 
sions denoting types) and individual terms, expressions denoting elements of types. 
Each individual term has a fixed type, and all the subterms of an individual term have 
a fixed type as well. So individual terms in A, always appear as t: A, where A is a 
type expression. This is called rigid typing. Simple type theory was first formulated by 
Church in 1940. 
For function types, the canonical method for constructing an element is by abstrac- 
tion: let t[x: A]: B be a term describing the construction of an element of type B from an 
arbitrary element x of type A, then Ax.t[x: A]: A--tB is the term t as function of x, an el- 
ement of type A -+ B. Since all elements of A --+ B are assumed to be functions, we of 
course also have application: 4 t: A-+B applied to s: A yields a term (t: A-+B)(s: A): B. 
I-, has standard set-theoretic models; in these models, the types are interpreted by 
sets, and terms t: A by elements of the set interpreting A. If we write fl 1 for the 
interpretation function, and p for the environment interpreting the individual and type 
variables, then [A -+ B& is the set of all set-theoretic functions from DA&, to [BJjp, etc. 
The rules for constructing terms in the simple type theory clearly correspond to the 
natural deduction rules for introducing an implication and eliminating an implication. 
Therefore, the following rule may be read either as a schematic rule of implication 
introduction, where the terms appearing at each node of the proof tree are nothing but 
a linear notation for the proof obtained hitherto, or as a schematic representation of 
4 In practice, when discussing simple type theory, one often drops a lot of the type information in exhibiting 
terms; otherwise expressions soon become unreadable. 
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the rule of term formation for function types: 
[x: A] 
t[x: A]: B 
2.x: A.t[x: B]: (A -+ B) 
Similarly for the elimination rule, 
t:A-B s:A 
(t:A+B)(s:A):B 
But the analogy goes still farther. Because of the meaning of lambda-abstraction, we 
have a rule of fi-conversion: 
(kc.t[x])s = t[x/s] 
(I have refrained from exhibiting the types, otherwise the notation gets so heavy.) 
Replacing in a term a subterm (h.t)s by t[x/s] is called a b-reduction step. If we 
replace a subterm of the form J.x.t[x]s by t[x/s], what corresponds to this in prooftrees? 
It means that we can replace a tree as on the left by the tree on the right, thereby 
removing a detour: 
The isomorphism as explained above covers only implication logic. But there is 
no difficulty in extending it to full predicate logic, by extending 1, with new type 
constructors, one constructor for each new logical operation, and new term-formation 
rules, one rule for each natural deduction rule. 
H.B. Curry 
The first clear expression of the formulas-as-types idea in the version FAT(A) was 
formulated by Curry in 1958 [ 151, with a hint of it in 1942 [ 131. Curry considered 
a calculus for assigning types to untyped lambda-terms. 5 The untyped terms are in 
a sense pure algorithms, without specified domain and range; or to put it otherwise, 
the lambda-calculus deals with a universe where everything can be both operation and 
5 Curry also considered combinatory logic, but in order not to complicate our story too much, we mostly 
concentrate on type assignment for the lambda calculus. 
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argument. But if we specify a subdomain for an argument, what can we say about the 
range of an operator? 
Curry first considered a system of type assignment corresponding on the logical side 
to a Hilbett-type axiomatization of intuitionistic implication logic. That is to say, he 
had two axioms assigning types to the constants K and S: 
K: (A + (B + A)), 
s: (A-+(B+C)) -+ ((A+B)+f+C)), 
where A, B, C are arbitrary type expressions, together with an analogue of modus po- 
nens: if t:A --) B and s: A, then ts: B. In the lambda calculus we may define the 
constants as K = E~y.x, S E ~zc~z.xz(~z). But inspired by Gentzens’s paper from 1935 
already mentioned, Curry also considered type-assignment systems corresponding to 
natural deduction and to Gentzen systems. Thus, in the natural deduction formulation, 
Curry’s rules are as follows: 
r,t:A t t:A 
l-,t:A- B rts:A l-‘,x:A t t:B 
r t ts:B l- t s4xx.t: A+B 
(x not occurring free in r.) These rules look just like another way of writing the rules 
of implication logic as exhibited above; the r in r t t: A is a list of typed variables 
representing the open assumptions in the derivation of t: A. There is an important 
difference however, Here the types are not considered to be part of the lambda terms, 
and the subterms of the lambda terms have no types attached to them. 
So Curry knew how to exploit the formulas-as-types parallel for his theories of type 
assignment. In particular, he uses the idea of Cut elimination, taken from Gentzen’s 
work. One might also say that Curry proves indirectly, via the correspondence between 
natural deduction and Gentzen systems, a normalization theorem for natural deduction 
for implication logic; as far as I know, this is the first published proof (Turing had 
a proof of normalization for simple type theory as early as 1942, but this was only 
published by Gandy in 1980). However, Curry does not formulate the result as a result 
on intnitionistic implication logic. For Curry, it is a normal form theorem for typable 
lambda terms. 
It should be pointed out that formulas-as-types has much more impact, and more 
interesting consequences, when formulated for natural deduction, than when it is for- 
mulated for Hilbert-type axiomatizations only. 6 
A few years after [ 151 appeared, Curry published a standard textbook [ 141, which 
contains a detailed treatment of natural deduction and Gentzen calculi, both for 
6 Far combinatory logic the parallel with Hilbert-type axiomatizations of implication logic is the most 
natural one. But although there may be formulated a normalization theorem for Hilbert-type logic, inspired 
by the notion of weak reduction for combinatory logic, this is not as interesting and useful as the reduction 
for I._ and natural deduction. In particular, there is no manageable subformula property. 
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intuitionistic and classical logic. It is a remarkable fact, that in this book Curry does 
not discuss the formulas-as-types parallel. 7 
Why did Curry not make use of the formulas-as-types parallel in his study of deduc- 
tion? I can only guess. One possible reason is a technical one. As we have explained 
above, the parallel becomes an isomorphism, if one compares natural deductions on the 
one hand, with simple type theory (with rigid typing) on the other hand. But Curry 
was interested not in simple type theory, but in type-assignment systems, and then 
the parallel is not as simple and clear-cut, and more difficult to formulate precisely. 
Another, perhaps more important reason may be the following: on the deduction side, 
“formulas-as-types” did not answer any questions Curry was interested in. Summariz- 
ing, the insights FAT(A) are present in Curry’s work, but not FAT(B). 
D. Prawitz 
In 196.5, Prawitz in a sense “rehabilitated” natural deduction. Gentzen considered 
natural deduction as the most basic type of formalization, since its rules correspond 
rather closely to steps in informal reasoning; but for technical work, more precisely, for 
obtaining metatheorems, he found the Gentzen systems LJ and LK more manageable. 
Literally, Gentzen says 
In order to be able to enunciate and prove the Hauptsatz, I had to provide a 
logical calculus especially suited to the purpose. For this the natural calculus 
proved unsuitable. For, although it already contains the properties essential to the 
validity of the Hauptsatz, it does so only with respect to its intuitionist form, 
in view of the fact that the law of the excluded middle, as pointed out earlier, 
occupies a special position in relation to these properties. * 
Prawitz’ starting point was the formulation where open hypotheses are always dis- 
charged as early as possible, but he also described a version with “assumption classes” 
which may be said to be isomorphic to simple type theory. (He needed such a version 
for his treatment of the modal logic S4.) On the other hand, there is no mention of 
Curry’s work in [ 151. Prawitz showed that natural deductions could be normalized; in 
a normal proof, a logical constant which has just been introduced is never eliminated 
at the next rule. Thus, normal proofs also have a claim to be called “direct”: in this 
case too, detours via more complex formulas do not occur, all formulas involved are 
subformulas of the conclusion. 
7 In fact, just as in [ 171, numbered assumption classes appear in Curry’s book, but all examples are 
compatible with the assumption that open hypotheses are discharged as early as possible, a convention 
which simplifies life as long as one is only interested in derivability, not in the derivations themselves, but 
which leads to an imperfect match with simple type theory. Therefore, it is not clear, from looking at the 
texts, whether Gentzen and Curry really were thinking of a natural deduction calculus isomorphic to simple 
type theory. 
8 The quote made me speculate whether perhaps Gentzen proved normalization (see below) for the intu- 
itionistic case. He certainly did not publish it. 
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RCA. Howard 
The first explicit formulation of “formulas-as-types” in the form FAT(B) is found 
in a paper by Howard [27] which widely circulated since 1969, but which appeared 
in print only in 1980. Howard’s aim was foundational: he wanted to develop a notion 
of construction suitable for the interpretation of intuitionistic mathematics. 9 Howard 
not only discusses formulas-as-types for propositional logic, but also for intuitionistic 
arithmetic. By FAT(B), normalization in L, is the same as in natural deduction. lo 
N.G. de Bruijn 
There is an independent discovery of the formulas-as-types idea in the form FAT(C) 
towards the end of the sixties, by de Bruijn [8]. De Bruijn and his group developed a 
language AUTOMATH, designed for the mechanical checking of mathematical proofs. De 
Bruijn’s only clue was the intuitionistic interpretation of implication, as formulated by 
Heyting for his proof interpretation. For a long time the results on AUTOMATH were not 
very accessible, since a lot of it could be found in internal reports and Ph.D. theses 
only; but recently all the interesting material on AUTOMATH was brought together in one 
volume [42]. 
H. Liiuchli 
Independently also, Ltiuchli [36] used in 1968 the ideas of formulas-as-types for 
obtaining a completeness proof for intuitionistic predicate logic, relative to a notion 
which might be regarded as a version of realizability. 
Martin-Lif’s type theories 
Formulas-as-types in the form FAT(B) and FAT(C) was the guiding idea behind the 
construction of an intuitionistic type theory by Martin-Liif. This type theory appeared 
in several versions. The first (inconsistent, impredicative) version dates from 1971, but 
the first published (consistent and predicative) version appeared in 1975. Martin-Liif’s 
original aim was to give a foundation for constructive mathematics, but in 1979 [40] 
he proposed a version of his type theory as a language for programming. The formulas- 
as-types idea in these theories results in bringing together, for example, induction over 
the natural numbers and definition of arithmetical functions by recursion, as instances 
of the same set of rules for the type of the natural numbers. (The same idea applies 
also to other data types.) 
9 Correspondence between Kreisel and Howard suggests that it was Martin-Lof who pointed out that the 
most pregnant expression of formulas-as-types, FAT(B), is obtained when the logic is based on natural 
deduction. (I owe this information to H.R. Jervell.) Cf. also the footnote in [27] added by Howard in 1979. 
Apparently critical remarks by Kreisel concerning the usefulness of fommlas-as-types w.r.t. the intended aim 
made Howard refrain from publishing his note. 
lo Howard states that he owes this insight to Tait, and refers to the paper [49]. 
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There is a strong flavour of realizability in the Martin-LGf type systems; one may 
very well think of these systems as incorporating an abstract version of Kleene’s real- 
izability. 
Thus, if t:(Zc:A)B(x), t must be a pair (to,tl) such that ti:B(ts) and to:A. It is this 
feature which makes it possible to use Martin-Lof’s theories for proofs-as-programs 
(or proofs-as-algorithms); if (3x: A)&) is a proposition describing a specification, 
a proof of (kA)B(x) in a Martin-Lof type system appears as a deduction with 
conclusion 
t: (3x: A)B(x) 
and from t we can extract the second component to for the required x. See also the 
next section. 
5. From constructivism to computer science 
In this final section I shall briefly describe two applications of the ideas discussed 
above, a theoretical one and a more practical one. 
5. I. The polymorphic lambda calculus 
The polymorphic lambda calculus, usually designed by 12 or as “system F” was 
first discovered by Girard in 1972 [ 191, and rediscovered some years later by Reynolds 
[46]. 12 is a powerful extension” of Iz,. The simplest way of describing it is to 
say, relying on FAT(B), that it is isomorphic to a natural deduction formulation of 
intuitionistic second-order propositional logic with implication and universal quanti- 
fiers over propositions. The rules for implication are as before, but the rules for the 
quantifiers are (P, Q propositional variables) 
A VQA 
‘dQWIQ1 A [Q/B1 
On the left, A has been derived with open assumptions not containing P free; on 
the right, [Q/B] denotes substitution of formula B for the propositional variable Q. In 
terms of types, this means that we have an abstraction operator ,4 over type variables 
corresponding to the rule of V-introduction, and an application of terms to types cor- 
responding to the V-elimination. For example, (Lx: A)(x: A) is the identity function for 
type A, and 
t = AP.(;lu:P)(x:P) 
is the universal identity function, which specializes, when applied to type A, to tA = 
(EL: A)(x: A). Generally, (AP.t)A = t[P/A]. If we want to extend the set-theoretic mod- 
els of Iz, to 122, we have to pick a domain for the range of the propositional variables, 
‘I In 12 all recursive functions which are provably total in classical or intuitionistic analysis, i.e., second- 
order arithmetic with impredicative comprehension, are representable by terms. 
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and then the objects of type VpA[P] are to be all functions assigning to each P in the 
propositional domain an object in type A[P]. 
Reynolds showed in 1984 [47] that such a set-theoretic model for 12 could not 
exist. However, Reynolds argument made essential use of classical logic. If we move 
to an alternative universe, with intuitionistic logic, there are other possibilities. One such 
solution is described in the paper by Pitts [44] ([45] is also illuminating in this respect), 
where it is shown that in the effective topos Eff we can construct a model for L2 based 
on a set-theoretic interpretation, in an intuitionistic universe. A topos may be seen as 
a category with extra structure, such that it is possible to interpret intuitionistic higher- 
order logic in it; one might say that toposes are just category-theoretic equivalents of 
models for intuitionistic higher-order logic. Eff is a topos which might be described as 
the category-theoretic version of Kleene realizability extended to intuitionistic higher- 
order logic; it was introduced by Hyland in 1980 [28]. For the construction of a model 
of 12 in Eff it is crucial that a generalization of the Uniformity Principle (mentioned 
in the section on realizability) holds. 
Longo and Moggi [37] use another category (m-set) for a model of polymorphism, 
also making use of the Uniformity Principle. For Hylands construction, see [29]. 
There are more nice examples of the fruitfulness of formulas-as-types in theory; for 
example, in the work of Barendregt, Coppo and Dezani [l] where intersection types are 
added to a standard type-assignment system, the theory of (slightly extended) natural 
deduction proofs is used to prove conservativeness of the extended system over the 
original system, that is to say the extension does not prove new statements in the old 
language. 
5.2. Formulas-as-types, programming, and proofs-as-algorithms 
The formulas-as-types idea in the version FAT(C) has served as a source of inspi- 
ration in the construction of several languages designed with the proofs-as-algorithms 
paradigm in mind. A survey may be found in [42, pp. 8-121. 
For example, there is the “calculus of constructions” by Coquand and Huet, combin- 
ing ideas from Girard’s r22 and AUTOMATH [ 11, 121. Luo [38] designed the “extended 
calculus of constructions”. For these languages implementations have been designed, 
such as LEGO and Coq, which can be used for interactive proof construction. 
Close to AUTOMATH is LF (“Logical Framework”) developed in Edinburgh [21]; this 
system has also been implemented. 
As mentioned above, Martin-Lof proposed a version of his type theory as a functional 
programming language, embodying the programs-from-proofs paradigma. In [43] this 
is elaborated in detail. 
In practice, one has to compromise with the purity of the original idea of com- 
pletely amalgamating propositions and types: it is not always useful to insist on “types 
= propositions”. For example, if one considers a subset of a given type A, one is not 
always interested in the information which provides the proof that a given element 
of A belongs to the subset, but only in the truth of this statement. Thus, one has to 
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relax the rigid schema of introduction and elimination rules, in exchange for a more 
convenient manipulation of subsets. Similarly, in AUTOMATH, where one is using clas- 
sical logic, one is not interested in the details of a proof of some proposition, so one 
introduces a principle of “irrelevance of proof’, in fact a coarse equivalence relation 
on the proofs of propositions, which tells us that any two proofs of a proposition are 
to be regarded as equivalent (cf. Zucker’s paper [52]). But for this principle one has 
to distinguish between types and propositions. So the formulas-as-types parallel is then 
relaxed; what remains from this idea is the general scheme for declaring what elements 
of a type (proposition are), with elimination rules as a counterpart to the introduction 
rules. 
This illustrates that ideas taken from theory are not used as such, but in applications 
nearly always have to be adapted and modified to the purpose at hand. 
There is also a system for interactive proof-construction based on Martin-Liif ‘s ideas, 
namely Nuprl [lo]. 
However, in order to use proofs as programs (algorithms) we do not have to go 
all the way to a constructive type theory. Simpler formalisms such as simple type 
theory, combined with a suitable variant of realizability (cf. our earlier remarks on 
q-realizability in Section 2) may do the job as well. - 
A nice example of this possibility was recently discovered by Berger (cf. [3]). The 
example concerns a special case of Higman’s lemma, namely the following statement 
Let (u,),, (b,), be two (infinite) sequences of natural numbers. Then there are 
i, j with i < j such that Ui da, and bi < bj. 
This statement is easily proved classically. Let 
Then ai, < ai, <ail < . . .; now pick for j the least k such that b, d bi,,, , then ij, ij+l , 
is a pair as in the statement. This proof is classical, but may be transformed into a 
constructive proof by a variant of a translation devised by H.M. Friedman, and to the 
resulting proof one then applies the so-called modified realizability (cf. [2]) in order 
to extract an algorithm. The variant of Friedman’s translation is chosen so as to keep 
the complexity of formulas down as much as possible, since this results in simpler 
extracted algorithms when applying the realizability interpretation. For our example 
the result is the following algorithm, where s ranges over lists of natural numbers, 
lead(s) is list s without last element, last(s) is the last element of list s, s * i is list 
s with i appended at the end, ( ) is the empty list: 
pair(s,i, j) := if bi<bj 
then if UidUj 
then (i,j) 
else if s = ( ) 
then pair(( ),j,j + 1) 
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else pair(lead(s), last(s),j) 
fi 
fi 
else pair(s * i, j, j + 1) 
fi 
and the sought for solution is pair(( ),O, 1). 
This results in a better algorithm than the “brute-force algorithm”, which is essentially 
a systematic search through all pairs (i, j): define 
br(i,j) := if i < j 
then if ai<<j and bi<bj 
then (i,j) 
else br(i + 1, j) 
fi 
else br(0, j + 1) 
fi 
and take for the solution br(0, 1). The new algorithm is faster; for suitable sequences 
it shows a quadratic improvement. 
The method sketched is sensitive to the choice of axioms in the formalization; extra 
axioms which are, strictly speaking, redundant (since derivable) may simplify the proof 
and hence simplify the extracted terms. 
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